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a b s t r a c t
'Free prior and informed consent' (FPIC) has emerged as an inﬂuential theme in contemporary debates
about mining and development. This paper considers the social knowledge base required to actualize the
notion of FPIC in particular mining contexts. FPIC introduces heightened social performance require-
ments at a time where many mining companies are still grappling with the fundamentals of their
corporate social responsibilities (CSR). The authors critically review the character of the current FPIC
debate as it relates to mining, and outline four conditional factors required to safeguard against social
risk. They posit that such risk could be exacerbated by mining companies that fail to comprehensively
account for social context and conditionalities. Given the industry's broad-based discursive engagement
with FPIC, there is an urgent need to extend the current debate beyond legal application and engage
with other, equally important, base concepts from the social sciences for the operationalization of FPIC.
& 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-SA
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/).
Introduction
The emergence of large-scale resource extraction has profound
consequences for a myriad of actors. In terms of prominence,
companies seeking to develop new projects, and the communities
who would ‘host’ those projects, are considered to sit at the
forefront of activity. States, in addition to securing a balance
between corporate and citizen rights, face the challenge of creat-
ing and fostering conditions for sustainable and diversiﬁed eco-
nomic growth if they are to avoid the so-called ‘resource curse’.
Traditionally, resource curse debates have focused on the eco-
nomic prospects of the ‘nation’, while at the local level, discussion
has centered on the formation of ‘resource enclaves’ (Auty, 2006;
Cardoso and Faletto, 1979). Research into the experiences of host
communities indicates a pattern whereby social risk accrues most
acutely among those people living nearest to mining activities
(Littlewood, 2013; Saha et al., 2011).1 It has been clear for some
time that the market system is unable to account for and regulate
the kind of dynamic social and human rights risk associated with
large scale development projects, and that new deliberate efforts
are required to ensure that social risk is identiﬁed, understood and
responded to by those parties involved in mining development.
There is signiﬁcant debate about how best to ‘regulate’ corporate
responsibilities in mining and whether ‘solutions’ should be entered
into voluntarily, or mandated by the rule of law and enforced by the
state (Schiavi and Solomon, 2007). Where there is tension over
responsibility for managing social impacts, expressions of discontent
readily emerge. Across different parts of the world, indigenous and
land-connected peoples, workers, and other social actors have
resisted the transformations and disruptions wrought by mining.
The pressure of social protest and resistance has, in some instances,
served to reconﬁgure regulatory regimes and company-state-
community relations (O'Faircheallaigh, 2012; Bebbington and Bury,
2009). In this article, we engage the FPIC proposition as an emerging
driver of industry reform, including where companies enter into an
FPIC process required under national legislation, or do so voluntarily
as a part of CSR policy. Like others, we offer caution in terms of the
‘degree of difﬁculty’ that the FPIC proposition presents (Szawblowski,
2011); but do not suggest that this as a reason not to proceed with a
FPIC process. The article highlights the need for a discourse that
extends beyond legal applicability, to one that better engages the
sociological and socio-historical complexities embodied in a FPIC
proposition.
The ‘base’ concept of FPIC has itself been driven by the global
indigenous movement and is tied to concepts of autonomy and
self-determination (Sawyer and Gomez, 2012). In this respect,
FPIC's origins sit outside of conventional mining discourse, but
nonetheless relate to many of those individual and collective
human rights that are relevant in the context of mineral extraction,
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mining-related risk, which would suggest risk to business, operations or
production.
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including: indigenous land rights, recognition of and respect for
culture, the right to economic participation, to a livelihood, to a clean
environment and so forth. The call for application of FPIC in mining
stems from a set of legacy issues whereby natural resource extraction
is identiﬁed as a major source of abuse of the rights of indigenous
peoples worldwide. In his report to the United Nations (UN) Human
Rights Council, the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, states that:
In its prevailing form, the model for advancing with natural
resource extraction within the territories of indigenous peoples
appears to run counter to the self-determination of indigenous
peoples in the political, social and economic spheres (Anaya,
2011, p. 82).
In addition to its origins in the domain of indigenous people's
rights, FPIC intersects with other emerging and prominent dis-
courses in mining, namely: ‘business and human rights’ and
‘participation in development’. At the intersection of these dis-
courses, we note the elevation of FPIC as a discursive driver for
reform within the resource sector in recognition of the legacies of
the past and the ongoing attachment of indigenous peoples to
their traditional lands, territories and resources (Anaya, 2011). The
status of FPIC as a regulatory inﬂuence in mining is multifarious.
FPIC is at once the subject of community protest where it is
thought to have been denied or manipulated; mandated by law by
a small but increasing number of states; required by a range of
standards-setting organizations such as the International Finance
Corporation (2011) through its inﬂuential Environmental and
Social Performance Standard 7 on Indigenous Peoples; and being
voluntarily endorsed by industry as a matter of CSR policy. This
latter application is subject to much scrutiny as the industry
navigates a cautious ‘commit yet contain’ position. Across this
range of engagements, the debate is trending towards the oper-
ability of FPIC; that is, application beyond idealized notions of how
consent processes might work in the context of mining and
towards how FPIC might be practiced. Whatever the status of
the debate within academic and industry forums, the FPIC agenda
continues to be pursued with purpose and determination by
indigenous people in many parts of the globe.
Presently there is no singular or universally accepted deﬁnition
of FPIC, no agreement on what a FPIC process must entail, and no
functional clarity about what constitutes ‘consent’.2 In the para-
graphs that follow, we engage FPIC at a conceptual level, and draw
a distinction between what we see as the legal and compliance-
driven deﬁnitions on the one hand, and a voluntary form of policy
on the other. This voluntary form extends the usage in two ways;
ﬁrstly, beyond legal applicability and towards FPIC as a policy
principle or ‘general rule’ when mining takes place within indi-
genous territory (Anaya, 2011, 2013); and secondly, beyond indi-
genous peoples and towards broad-based community consent. In
this article, we refer to this voluntary form as ‘FPIC by extension’;
that is, beyond status-dependent forms of FPIC that are restricted
to recognized groups, and towards a broader application.3 The
ability to cleave such distinctions reﬂects fundamental challenges
in the concept and in its applicability to different contexts and
conditions. And while differentiating between legal and voluntary
forms is helpful for the purposes of understanding the discourse,
recent developments demonstrate a recognition by industry of at
least three pressing practice challenges, including the need to:
(i) address the unequal playing ﬁeld on which indigenous people
(or customary land holders) and developers negotiate on beneﬁts
and impacts; (ii), align industry practice with the business and
human rights agenda; and (iii) build a global framework for
integrating locally held notions of rights and entitlement with
internationally deﬁned norms and social safeguards surrounding
the spread and dynamic presence of capital.
Against this background, we consider the risks and beneﬁts of
operationalizing the FPIC proposition, including in less than ideal
circumstances. In our consideration of context, we recognize that
for mining companies there are internal and external dimensions
to this debate and note that the ‘internal’ dimensions of CSR policy
are often overlooked (Kemp and Owen, 2013; Rajak, 2011; Welker,
2009; Ballard and Banks, 2003). We also introduce a body of
literature that rarely features in contemporary debates about the
social aspects of mining. The aim in this article is to broaden the
current debate by highlighting some of the complex sociological
dimensions implied by FPIC and mining. There is increasing
recognition that of all the disciplines required for ‘responsible
mining’ it is the social discipline that is the weakest. Given the
socio-historical and political intricacies implied by the FPIC pro-
position, operationalization of the framework will require heigh-
tened capability and performativity in the very domain that has
yet to reach its potential in mining. Unless there is a radical
reconﬁguration of the industry's approach to the social aspects of
mining, underperformance could serve to widen the gap between
CSR policy and practice, and potentially exacerbate those same
issues that generate social risk.
Discursive convergence: indigenous peoples, human rights
and principles of participation
The UN Guiding Principles (GPs) on Business and Human Rights
(2011) have been endorsed by the International Council on Mining
and Metals (ICMM), its members, and a range of other non-
member companies. In order to discharge the corporate respon-
sibility to ‘respect’ human rights, companies have integrated (or
have indicated their intention to incorporate) requirements from
the UN GPs into corporate policy and procedure. Although the UN
GPs make no formal reference to indigenous rights or FPIC,
corporate commitments in the arena of business and human rights
have nonetheless facilitated FPIC's ascendance as a potential
mechanism of industry reform. For otherwise committed compa-
nies to deny indigenous or land-connected peoples a pivotal role
in development decisions readily provokes the accusation that
companies are avoiding the corporate responsibility to respect
human rights, and are instead seeking to assert a right to
dispossess (Bebbington and Bury, 2013). This is certainly a work-
able advocacy platform, and encourages industry to extend the
application of FPIC beyond the ‘base’ concept.
Corporate commitment to the UN GPs is but one arena that
suggests discursive and policy convergence between FPIC and human
rights, and the emergence of ‘FPIC by extension’. Several global
companies have indicated ‘support for’ or ‘alignment with’ the UN
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (DRIP) (UN, 2007). This
declaration sets out individual and collective rights of indigenous
people and speciﬁcally calls upon states to obtain FPIC for projects
that affect indigenous people's lands or territories. As a policy
platform, corporate support of UN DRIP is voluntary, and it is not
referenced in the UN GPs. Likewise industry engagement with other
instruments of international law, such as the International Labor
Organization's (ILO, 1991) Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention
169 is also relevant. The convention sits outside the suite of eight
core ILO Conventions that comprise ‘internationally recognized
2 Recognizing that most guidance suggests that consent and associated
processes should be determined locally.
3 Goodland (2004) for example suggests that an FPIC process should be
grounded in the degree to which livelihood and culture are dependent on
customary lands, rather than application being strictly tied to indigeneity. See also
Hanna and Vanclay (2013) and Voss and Greenspan (2012) for statements
advocating the extension of FPIC beyond application to indigenous peoples.
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human rights’ as deﬁned by the UN GPs, and is thus not an explicit
element of the corporate responsibility to ‘respect’.4 Nonetheless,
companies and industry bodies associate with the convention via
reference in corporate position statements, corporate policy frame-
works and a range of guidance notes (Voss and Greenspan, 2012).
Such association with the convention is particularly relevant to a
discussion of ‘FPIC by extension’ where companies are operating in
non-ratifying states, or in jurisdictions that have ratiﬁed but have not
successfully enshrined requirements of ILO 169 into domestic law.5
These developments readily begin to draw the mining industry into a
‘beyond compliance’ FPIC discourse.
In seeking to understand the industry’s approach to FPIC
beyond indigenous peoples, one should consider the ICMM's
Position Statement on Indigenous Peoples and Mining (ICMM,
2013). Brieﬂy, the ICMM's position statement requires members
to: undertake meaningful engagement with potentially impacted
indigenous peoples, understand and respect indigenous peoples
rights through baseline and impact assessment studies; ensure
meaningful participation in decision-making processes; agree
what would constitute ‘consent’ in speciﬁc circumstances; and
seek to achieve it through dialog and collaboration with respon-
sible authorities. While this sets out a minimum set of require-
ments for application to indigenous people, it is the following
overview statement that suggests that ‘FPIC by extension’ is
acceptable: ‘Where both indigenous and non-indigenous peoples
are likely to be impacted, members may choose to extend the
commitments embodied in this position statement to non-
indigenous people’. A recent Oxfam America study suggests that
extractive companies are starting to incorporate notions of ‘consent’
and equivalent terms into CSR policy, and do not always attach
these commitments to indigenous peoples (Voss and Greenspan,
2012). The Oxfam study also conﬁrms the abovementioned associa-
tion phenomenon, and documents a number of instances where
reference to ‘consent’ is made directly alongside commitments to
respect human rights. These examples provide an early indication of
an apparent willingness of some parts of the industry to consider
‘FPIC by extension’ as part of a policy-level convergence between
FPIC and the business and human rights discourse.
The second point of discursive convergence stems from the rise
and incorporation of community development discourse into
mining policy. The importance of ‘social inclusion’, community
‘empowerment’ and ‘participation’ has assumed a normative
position in a broad range of industry policy frameworks
(Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada (PDAC), 2014;
International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM), 2010;
Minerals Council of Australia (MCA), 2005; Mining Association of
Canada (MAC), 2005). In fact, ‘freedom of expression’ and ‘parti-
cipation’ are also established in international human rights law
where, separately from ‘consent’, individuals and indigenous
peoples have the right to oppose and actively express opinion or
opposition about extractive projects (Anaya, 2013). The focus on
local-level participation also aligns with the ‘subsidiarity princi-
ple’, whereby decisions about development ought to be made as
close to the local level as possible. This principle is embedded in
the Brundtland (1987) deﬁnition of sustainable development (SD),
to which much of the mining industry has so publicly subscribed.
From one vantage point, mining industry endorsement of FPIC
beyond pure legal requirement can be read as part of the natural
and (naturally) incremental evolution of the sector's thinking on
meaningful community engagement. Aside from ongoing delib-
erations about ‘power of veto’, parts of the industry are moving
beyond conceptual debates about whether FPIC is a valid concept,
and are engaging in multi-stakeholder discussions about how it
might be operationalized, including affected persons.
A key rationale for the industry's adoption of FPIC in policy is ‘risk
management’ (Buxton and Wilson, 2013; Campbell, 2012; Lehr and
Smith, 2010). Under a risk management framework it is the tripartite
elements of: clarity of ‘consent’; an agreed approach to impact
management and beneﬁt distribution; and a deﬁned process for
handling ‘grievance’ that addresses the risk of instability and
unpredictability. FPIC also implies a more tangible CSR product
compared to informal notions of social approval, such as the much
coveted ‘social license’.6 In order for the FPIC proposition to deliver
on its potential, a complex suite of ‘conditionalities’ must be met,
including: a functional regulatory framework, freedom from coer-
cion, a serviceable land tenure system, parties that are willing to
engage in a public process about land access and economic partici-
pation (Buxton and Wilson, 2013; Mahanty and McDermott, 2013;
Campbell, 2012; Voss and Greenspan, 2012; Szawblowski, 2011; Lehr
and Smith, 2010; Colchester and Ferrari 2007; The Environment Law
Institute, 2004).
For mining companies to comprehend how FPIC might be
operationalized in practice, they must understand the socio-
political context and characterize its associated conditionalities.
Failing to do so would put projects – and communities – at great
risk. This would be the case, for example, if a company assumed or
attributed freedoms that did not exist in a given context by asking
people to participate in a process that exposed them to the risk of
retribution or other forms of repression or reprisal (either by the
state or within their own communities). We suggest that in some
contexts and under certain circumstances, the social risks of
entering into a FPIC process will outweigh the risk to business.
This rather perverse outcome becomes a concern given that the
mining industry's functions and processes for identifying and
integrating socio-political knowledge into mainstream business
are still poor relative to the strength of its other disciplines (e.g.
mining, minerals processing, ﬁnancial, legal, health, safety and
environmental management). Processes for improving the social
knowledge base in critical areas have not been realized, despite
their potential to diagnose issues relating to land and conﬂict, as
well as barriers to the meaningful participation of project affected
peoples. For instance, human rights due diligence is in its infancy
(Harrison, 2013), social impact assessment is yet to provide a
stable base for industry decision-making (Esteves et al., 2012), and
the organizational function that has carriage of key aspects of FPIC
largely exists on the periphery of mining industry practice (Kemp
and Owen, 2013; Owen and Kemp, 2013).7
Much of the industry still struggles to understand the social
risk that mining poses to people and their lands, let alone the risks
associated with introducing what will be in most cases a new and
4 The ‘commentary’ under UN GP 12 does indicate, however, that: ‘Depending
on circumstances, business enterprises may need to consider additional standards.
For instance, enterprises should respect the human rights of individuals belonging
to speciﬁc groups or populations that require particular attention, where they may
have adverse human rights impacts on them’. This suggests that an additional set of
instruments, such as the UN DRIP, may indeed be relevant in certain circumstances.
It must be noted that the UN GPs are themselves still a form of ‘soft law’ and
therefore still essentially ‘voluntary’.
5 ILO 169 does not require FPIC per se, but consultation with indigenous
peoples. There are certainly those who suggest that the way the term ‘consultation’
as used in ILO 169 overlaps with the concept of ‘consent’.
6 See Owen and Kemp (2013) for a critique of this concept.
7 The notion of ‘human rights due diligence’ has gained prominence under
Professor John Ruggie's Protect, Respect and Remedy framework for business and
human rights (2008). The social dimensions of conventional due diligence
processes, such as those undertaken for an acquisition or major capital investment,
are not well canvassed in current debates about mining and social performance.
These conventional due diligence processes remain relatively ‘hidden’, presumably
due to the commercial-in-conﬁdence nature of associated transactions. We image
that FPIC will no doubt be incorporated into these processes in the future. How FPIC
is accounted for in the full range of due diligence processes will become an
important forward consideration.
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highly conditional socio-political FPIC process. Others are similarly
concerned that FPIC is a problematic proposition in practice.
Colchester and Ferrari (2007, p. 20) suggest that insisting on the
right to FPIC can create new vulnerabilities and a ‘blind alley’ for
recognition of indigenous rights, with Szawblowski (2011, p. 127)
observing that in the extractives sector ‘it is not clear that FPIC
holds the emancipatory promise wished for’. There are a range of
factors necessary for ensuring that context and circumstances are
conducive to operationalizing FPIC. Unless there is a radical
recalibration of the industry's approach to the social dimensions
in mining, FPIC may well become an instrument of social risk
rather than an instrument for reforming the way the industry
conceives and values its relationships.
Despite what we see to be the importance of a deep and
historical engagement with the social dimensions of FPIC in
mining, we observe a broader discourse that is focused on the
legal, compliance and communicative aspects of FPIC.8 Within the
current debate there is insufﬁcient attention paid to the socio-
logical and socio-historical dimensions that determine the indus-
try's relationship with indigenous and other project-affected
people. We explore the social risk of pursuing FPIC when much
of the industry has failed to demonstrate its capacity to engage
with and respond to social and political context. We draw on a
select number of ‘foundation works’ from social historians, anthro-
pologists and applied political scientists who have engaged a range of
‘rights’ and ‘relational’ issues. We concur with Szawblowski’s (2011)
call for critical implementation research in relation to FPIC in practice,
but see a more pressing need for a robust set of frameworks and
concepts for navigating basic social issues related to fundamental
aspects of community relations in mining.
Conditional imperatives
The previous section noted trends and major deﬁnitional
categories emerging from the current literature on mining and
FPIC. The dynamic intersection of international law and safe-
guards, national legislation, local systems of custom and land
entitlement, together with corporate policy frameworks, project
approaches and the involvement of other actors such as indepen-
dent facilitators, NGOs and representative bodies, ensures that any
single deﬁnition of FPIC will struggle under the weight of com-
plexity. Individual case examples demonstrate the inherent difﬁ-
culties of holding these factors in tension, especially while
attempting to preserve the integrity of the FPIC framework.9
Howsoever one may seek to deﬁne the concept, the underlying
structure of the framework conﬁrms the highly conditional nature
of the FPIC proposition, which we detail in Table 1.
Consistent with this literature, we now identify and discuss
what we consider to be four core challenges relating to scope and
operational potential of the FPIC proposition. While the presumed
strength of FPIC is its prioritization of local needs and interests, the
test for FPIC will not only be its utility in highly conducive
contexts, but in those socio-political environments where the
state has been unable to effectively protect and safeguard the
human rights, and particularly land rights, of its citizens.
Condition 1: structural compatibility
The operability of FPIC relies on a certain level of structural
‘compatibility’ with the host context and culture.10 This is noted in
contemporary literature and guidance notes, although its signiﬁcance
is somewhat understated. Where incompatibilities are present, com-
panies are encouraged to take a ‘cautious’ approach, and engage with
states about the importance of consultation and consent processes
(Buxton and Wilson, 2013; Campbell, 2012; Lehr and Smith, 2010).
This guidance seems to lead to a belief that FPIC is possible in nation
states governed by authoritative or single party regimes. In Vietnam
and the Lao PDR for example, neither indigenous nor collective land
rights are recognized, and the approach to remedy oscillates between
customary modes of conﬂict resolution and party controls for political
dissent (Morris-Jung and Roth, 2010; Baird and Shoemaker, 2007;
Dang, 2006; Evrard and Goudineau, 2004). In these contexts, without
major intervention, modiﬁcations to the FPIC framework could be such
that the underlying principles are difﬁcult, if not impossible, to apply.
In a strongly incompatible scenario, the articulation of indi-
genous or community consent or refusal is likely to be considered
partial or void by political elites or the dominant class, unless a
FPIC process is somehow excised from ‘normal politics’. FPIC could
be attempted, for example, as a one-off exercise, with one com-
munity for the purpose of securing a single project approval.
An isolated and instrumental application of FPIC, however, runs
the risk of subverting established political processes without
providing structural support for the broader recognition of rights,
and as a consequence does not guarantee community approval for
the company with any more certainty than it respects the broader
human rights concerns of people. Colchester and Ferrari (2007)
suggest that FPIC actions need to be part of a wider political
process to aid in the defense of indigenous rights and livelihoods.
Aside from when they are furthering their own commercial
interests, foreign-owned mining companies are usually reticent
to engage in host country politics, particularly where it may be
perceived as a threat to state sovereignty.
Finally, some people may fear reprisal from participating in a
FPIC process knowing the state would be unlikely to endorse such
a process. In some contexts is it not possible to engage openly
Table 1
List of conditions conducive to FPIC.
Element Conducive conditions
Support for human rights Formal, customary and enacted demonstration
of support for human rights; recognition of
diverse and locally deﬁned sets of rights and
entitlement
Negotiation framework Transparency; willingness and freedom to
engage in ‘good faith’ negotiation
Parties Ability to discern parties that should be
involved
in an FPIC process
Relationship Deﬁned relationships, trust between parties
and/or the process
Power dynamics Equalising strategies and systems in place to
offset potential disparities
Knowledge Advanced knowledge of FPIC its associated
rights and conditionalities, with a willingness to
enable other parties that do not possess a priori
knowledge
Capacity Capacity to convey, receive and analyze
information as it applies to previous, present or
future impediments to human rights and
development
8 To take one speciﬁc example, the BSR publication (Campbell, 2012, p. 14) for
example suggests that in applying FPIC where legislation is absent or gaps exist, a
corporation should conduct due diligence on the relevant international and
national legal frameworks and standards and consider FPIC as part of its approach
to overall approach to risk management and integrate FPIC into engagement plans.
The emphasis on social aspects is minimal.
9 See for example, Voss and Greenspan (2012) for cases from Peru and Bolivia;
Environmental Law Institute (2004) for cases from Peru, Canada and the United
States.
10 Here we are putting aside the question of FPIC's compatibility with mining
industry culture and market context, and focusing on externalities.
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about human rights, let alone FPIC. Recent history is replete with
examples of citizen dissent being quashed by the state (Paige,
1975; Wolf, 1969; Thompson, 1966). Where oppressive politics are
a present and dominant factor, operationalizing FPIC by extension
would require nothing short of political revolution, not the
introduction of an isolated consent process pre-ﬁgured to secure
mineral production rights and permission to proﬁt.
Condition 2: clear process and representation
Representation poses several problems for FPIC. How an FPIC
process deﬁnes or qualiﬁes communities and engages with repre-
sentative leaders and/or bodies will be a major determinant of its
overall success. International standards suggest that representa-
tion and levels of participation are best determined by commu-
nities themselves, according to their traditional decision-making
processes (Anaya, 2011, 2013; ICMM, 2010). Challenges can
emerge, however, where these processes exclude large sub-
sections of a community, such as women or youth. In other
instances, traditional processes may have broken down, or diluted
as a result of colonization, or other historical processes. In the
extractive industries, the negotiation of community development
agreements (or beneﬁt sharing/land use agreements) has raised
similar sets of issues; namely – on what basis should a community
or individual representatives be included or excluded, what level
of participation and representation is required to give each party
conﬁdence in the agreement-making process (and the ﬁnal pro-
duct), how does the process handle disagreement and how is non-
participation represented and weighed (O'Faircheallaigh, 2012;
Brereton et al., 2011)?11
The point here is that these are not new problems. The
industry's slow and inconsistent progress to enter into agreements
other than where they are legally required is itself a signiﬁcant
threat to the operationalization of FPIC. Involvement of non-
industry actors to facilitate engagement may provide higher levels
of assurance of process and outcome, however, engagement of any
kind will face similar challenges. If the objective of a FPIC process
is to reach a clear decision of ‘consent’ or ‘refusal’, there must be a
mechanism through which to determine what counts as consent,
and how much of it is needed in order to proceed to the next
step.12 One residual question that is rarely addressed refers to
minority or dissenting positions (Nadeau and Blais, 1993); how are
these to be interpreted and incorporated into ongoing considera-
tions after a determining decision has been reached?
In the case of a mining project, for example, how far beyond
what is considered to be the immediate mining footprint would a
FPIC process extend? What are the limits and how are they going
to be deﬁned if parameters are not deﬁned, or even ill-deﬁned, by
the state? At what points in the life of a project does consent need
to be revisited? Are grants of consent reversible, and under what
circumstances? The geographic deﬁnition of impact depends very
much on what issues the process will take as its focus. For
example, communities living close to a regional center (or soon
to be regional center) may not register as immediately impacted
by virtue of the mine's presence, but could feel a greater level of
socio-economic impact through in-migration and inﬂation at a
later stage (Davies and Head, 1995; Steel, 2013).13 Given the overall
complexity of mining and mining related impacts, and the dual
condition of ‘informed’ and ‘consent’, the early and extensive
identiﬁcation of issues and interests would appear to be pivotal
if FPIC is to be an inclusive and workable paradigm. At a minimum
this will require the industry to avoid a formulaic, tick-box variety
of proponent conducted SIAs, and move toward new approaches
with high standards of professional expertise and strong roles for
project-affected communities and (O'Faircheallaigh and Gibson,
2010).
Condition 3: adequate allocation of resources
Depending on the ﬁnal conﬁguration, level of commitment, and
rigor, FPIC will require substantial inputs to ensure its effectiveness
(at best) and or relevance (at least) in any given context. In its most
optimistic form, FPIC assumes comprehensive protection of human
rights by responsive and capable states; with citizens who understand
the scope and content of their rights, and who are willing and able to
assert and exercise those rights. These assumptions are, in essence,
pre-conditions for a full application of the framework. To date the
framework has found its most ready ﬁt in Australia and Canadawhere,
curiously enough, legislation does not align entirely with international
law but where there are processes for recognition of indigenous rights
by the nation state.14 Other states, such as Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia,
the Philippines and Papua New Guinea, recognize both customary
and/or indigenous rights to land and require processes of consultation
and/or consent, but implementation has been problematic. However,
even under more favorable circumstances (such as those listed above),
the implementation of FPIC requires additional monitoring, the
establishment of a rights-compatible remedy processes, in addition
to a serious injection of resources to support the practical demands
for training and capacity building, technical supervision, multi-
stakeholder engagement and coordination (among a host others).
Where the legislative and political structure of the host country is
less compatible with the principles and functional requirements of
FPIC, the workload, and indeed the resources required to address
power imbalances and social risk, is far greater. Where funds originate,
who furnishes them, through what mechanisms, when and for what
purpose are important points of agreement, quite aside from agree-
ment about the nature of ‘consent’. The range of resources required in
any given context is likely to be signiﬁcant, and may require, for
example, provision of support for dissenting groups, improvement of
state-based or corporate processes, or the appointment of indepen-
dent facilitators or monitors. Each particular context will no doubt
have its own narrative of trust and tension, and in each case care will
be needed to ensure that the nature and level of resourcing is
appropriate and agreeable to all parties. Where third parties become
involved, trust in a facilitated process will in part depend on the
credibility or familiarity of the facilitating actor. The requirement for
trust may end up proving to be more essential than a demand for
neutrality, where in the case of the latter, this person or persons could
be viewed as unknown, and therefore untrustworthy. Resourcing
decisions are a critical condition that will inﬂuence levels of trust
and determine the effectiveness and applicability of any FPIC process.
Condition 4: equitable distribution of risk and liability
Socio-political issues can hold up or shut down extractive
industry projects. In fact, recent research suggests that this now
11 Identifying and calculating the intricacies of collective consent, and their
intersection with the state is a long standing problem in political and economic
theory. While the FPIC framework will not need to resolve these debates at a
universal level, the process of obtaining, measuring and assuring the quality of
consent will nonetheless need to be considered at the local level if ‘agreement’,
‘consent’ or ‘refusal’ are to be regarded as legitimate outcomes.
12 For our purposes we do not assume that the next point will automatically
result in consent. If the FPIC process is to be complete, the various parties will need
to determine how a veto or refusal decision will be incorporated.
13 Trans-boundary issues are of increasing concern where people are affected
outside the jurisdictional catchment area, and extraterritorial remedies are not
in place.
14 Notably, these states initially voted against UN DRIP in the General
Assembly.
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occurs at more than double the rate of technical delays (Cattaneo,
2009). Individual companies can demonstrate progress in CSR and
sustainable development at the policy level. But otherwise, there is
a certain inertia associated with the mining industry's approach to
social performance in practice (International Institute of
Environment and Development (IIED), 2012). While there are a
number of complex issues at play, recent cases such as the high
proﬁle Marikana massacre in South Africa, the suspended Minas
Conga project in Peru and the abandoned Lanjigarh bauxite
mining project in India, highlight the fact that there signiﬁcant
costs to bear and risks to shoulder in the process of mineral
development (Franks et al., 2014).
Thus far, we have suggested that where there is incompatibility
in context, where modes and mechanisms for representation and
participation are unclear, and where there is an inadequate or
incommensurate allocation of resources relative to the complex-
ities at hand, that the parties involved in pursing FPIC in mining
will need to take positive and deliberate steps to address the full
range of challenges. This will inevitably involve liabilities. We
suggest that the distribution of risk and liability should be
equitable amongst those with the capacity to bear them. History
shows that unless the full scope and depth of associated social
risks are understood and attended to, it is the most vulnerable
who will inevitably carry the greatest burden.
In a modern welfare state, mine-affected communities may be
supported through interventions designed to relieve particular
pressures, or even mitigate risks. But what happens when safe-
guards and safety nets are not provided? What role should other
parties play in achieving FPIC in less than ideal circumstances?
Lenders and insurers are a driving force behind the growth of the
global mining industry and the ascendance of the FPIC agenda, as
are international NGOs, few of which have resources to spare on
complex, private sector implementation challenges. What is the
role of these actors if consent processes fail and conﬂict ensues
after companies have sunk their capital and exited the ﬁeld? As a
largely ‘untested’ concept in the mining industry, powerful actors
must agree upon an equitable distribution of risk and liability as a
condition of pursing any FPIC process.
FPIC and social complexity
In the previous section we outlined four present challenges and
conditions implied by FPIC. For the most part, these challenges
reﬂect long standing and seemingly intractable issues. At this stage
in the article readers may be expecting a rejection of the FPIC
model, and or in its place an alternative. We might also have
provided a practical, ‘step-wise’ pathway for successful operatio-
nalization of the FPIC proposition. This would be premature. From
our perspective, the viability of the FPIC proposition is dependent
on the presupposition that the industry, and other actors, have the
knowledge systems in place for applying the framework. Our
position is that in order for the FPIC framework to be both useful
and internally coherent, the users of the framework must be
capable of identifying, analyzing and incorporating diverse types
of sociological, socio-historical and anthropological data into
decision-making frameworks.
This section of the article introduces three concepts from the
social science literature as means of expanding the analytic scope
of the existing debate about FPIC and mining. These concepts have
been selected on the grounds that they are directly relevant for
understanding themes that are (or should be) of perennial interest
to the extractives sector: namely: notions of rights and entitle-
ment, risk and change, land and labor relations, and social conﬂict.
The discussions will assist FPIC practitioners in more accurately
characterizing complex social issues, and in identifying root causes
and patterns that sit within the many and multifaceted challenges
encountered in the context of mining. That many of the works
referenced in this section were written on related topics but on
matters other than mining should be seen as an advantage – they
illuminate key concepts, broaden the intellectual horizon and
deepen the base of social knowledge on mining and company–
community relations.
Embedded goods and entitlements
In this section we draw upon the work of philosophers,
economists and social anthropologists. The two authors that we
are interested in are Amartya Sen and Karl Polanyi, who in
different but related ways demonstrate the deeply contextual
nature of seemingly common sets of taken for granted rights and
entitlements. For the purposes of this article our interest in Sen
and Polanyi is limited to explaining some of the fundamental
dependencies that exist between people and resources (even those
as basic as food stuffs). These insights into the composition and
functioning of social networks serve as critical reminders for the
mining and extractives sectors, because while this knowledge may
be second nature, or even ‘old-hat’ for social scientists, the
sophistication and conceptual clarity of these debates is not
always prominent in the resource industry. The relevance to FPIC
is that relational dependencies may go unnoticed – or worse – that
the outcomes of a consent process damage or undermine pre-
existing entitlement networks.
According to Nobel Prize winner Amartya Sen, and using access
to food as the example, people rely upon different sets of
entitlements in order to avoid starvation. This approach, elegantly
described in Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and
Deprivation (1981), places the cause of starvation on entitlement
failures, and not as many would have it, on the supply or general
availability of food. For Sen, individuals have bundles of entitle-
ments, or ‘entitlement bundles’, which can be exchanged, for
among other things, food. In his essay Sen describes four well
known sources of entitlements such as: (i) production based;
(ii) trade-based; (iii) own-labor; and (iv) inheritance and transfer. The
ﬁrst three of these categories rely largely on the use of a person's
own labor, that is to grow one's own food, to earn money that would
be exchanged for food, or labor in direct exchange for food. The
fourth category relies on a person being given food by others.
These examples have focused on food alone, however, the
relevance of the entitlement approach is not limited to the
provisioning of one (albeit very necessary) good. While the ﬁrst
three categories listed in the above paragraph all refer to an
individual converting their labor into a good, they should not be
viewed as any less relationship-dependent than the fourth example,
where the beneﬁt of the social network appears to be more
obvious. All entitlements, whether food or land or employment
or trade, depend on the willingness of others to recognize, uphold
and service those entitlements. Entitlement failures result not only
from a supply of goods and services, but from the straining of
social relationships and networks. In terms of FPIC, mining
industry actors must be aware that if consent is given for certain
assets, a range of other entitlements may be affected. Secondary
loss of entitlement may need to be accounted for, or at the very
least recognized in discussions about FPIC.
The work of Karl Polanyi has been central in establishing the
relational foundation of important social institutions, such as
markets and governance systems. The much used phrase ‘all
economies are embedded in social relations’ from Polanyi's
(1944) The Great Transformation highlights a simple fact; that
transactions of any kind are reliant in some fundamental way,
upon relationships with others (if only to complete the transac-
tion). Using Polanyi's schema, understanding the conﬁguration
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and working of markets, for instance, requires an analysis of the
social relationships which are involved and depend upon that
system of organization. Through his widely acclaimed study of
economic history, Polanyi's work demonstrates both the strengths
and vulnerabilities attached to entitlements within deeply
embedded economic systems.
Where mining and embedded systems typically intersect is
around land. The impact of this inter-sectionality is most evident
where people are physically and or economically displaced from
their land.15 Resettlement activity often raises vital questions
about the difference between forgone value and replacement
value, with increasing sensitivity to the important role of social
networks and their effect on livelihoods and entitlements.16 These
considerations do not come as readily to the fore when talking
about the impact and presence of resource extraction projects
more generally, despite the expansive and enduring effects on land
tenure, systems of traditional authority, basic demography, natural
resource use, economic provisioning, among many others.
The relevance for FPIC is nothing short of immediate. Granting
consent or assertions of refusal need to be thoroughly contextua-
lized if the decision by the local population is to be appropriately
understood. In the same way that FPIC requires accurate and
timely information to be provided to local stakeholders, one
should assume that resource developers will acquire for them-
selves both the knowledge and the tools needed to understand the
context they are intending to alter, and operate within. This alone
represents a major challenge for the industry, which for decades
has not been able to effectively integrate or utilize social science
methods into its core planning frameworks.
Risk aversion and change
The previous section emphasized the importance of under-
standing how notions of entitlement can inform FPIC processes,
and how failing to account for ‘entitlement bundles’ can create
social risk for mine-affected communities. In this section, we
highlight the value of James C. Scott's work for understanding
how mining companies might build on their understanding of
subsistence economics and drivers of social resistance. In his
groundbreaking 1976 book The Moral Economy of the Peasant:
Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia, Scott focuses on patron
client relations in colonial Burma and Vietnam. While this period
may seem irrelevant to mining and community relations, Scott's
work is instructive from the vantage point of understanding the
dynamics that unfold when a foreign actor induces change in an
existing social order. For the mining industry, understanding the
nature and character of social change in fact holds great relevance
not only for FPIC processes, but of social performance more
generally.
The ﬁrst concept that Scott introduces is the notion of the
‘subsistence ethic’; which is not simply a cultural phenomenon,
but a mechanism for survival in predominantly agrarian societies.
Scott shows how disruptions to land tenure, and shifts from land
ownership, to tenancy or waged labor can rupture social relations
and plunge already vulnerable people into dearth. Demonstrating
how relations of exchange under a patronage system provide
certain protections, Scott's work demonstrates the durability of
such systems, largely due to the insurances provided in years of
hardship. In the context of universal human rights and notions of
‘consent’, these established relations can easily be read as exploi-
tative, while at the same time fulﬁlling the right to subsist and
adhering to peasant norms of reciprocity and ‘decent relations’.
This is central to mine-community relations from a number of
perspectives, foremost amongst which are insights into the social
risks associated with disruption, however, exploitative the existing
social order might appear to outsiders. Scott's work also suggests
that the pre-existing social order will inﬂuence the relationship
that rights holders will seek with a company if FPIC is indeed
provided for industrial activities.
An additional insight into the workings of pre-existing social
order can be gleaned from Scott's examination of colonial tax
regimes. In Scott's example, the imposition of tax levies to support
the colonial administration proved to be both onerous from the
vantage point of quantity and with respect to the pressures placed
on peasant communities in meeting their subsistence require-
ments. Commenting on the colonial tax system Scott notes its
highly bureaucratized nature as compared with the more rela-
tional and seasonal character of the traditional feudal order that
peasants were accustomed to working under. Scott argues that
while both the colonial regime and the patron-client system
placed weighty demands on the peasantry, a major cause of
resistance and rebellion was the colonial disregard for existing
ways of life. In Scott's view, the feudal system may well have
depended on its ability to extract resources from the villages, but
its relative success was founded upon a dynamic system of
reciprocal rights and obligations in which tenants and landlords
were inextricably bound to one another.
The implication of this insight for FPIC in mining is that
consent-granting processes should be considered as involving
more than a transaction in which one party transfers permission
to the other. Instead, the granting of consent for something as
signiﬁcant as the right to exploit natural resources ought to be
regarded as constituting a major obligation on the part of the
developer. The relationships that may result in consent being
granted will no doubt be the very same relationships that are
utilized to assert expectations or other assumed rights. Scott's
work reminds us that in the process of exploitation, relationships
also matter, not just the act of granting or withholding consent.
Land and conﬂict
In this third section, we invoke several key pieces of what we
consider to be foundation literature on land relations and conﬂict.
As our starting point we quote Paige (1996) on land reform to
illustrate the overarching signiﬁcance of changes to land and land
tenure – an inevitable process in any mining context. According to
Paige (1996, p. 127):
The causes as well as the consequences of land reform are
revolutionary. Land reform is not really reform at all. In an
agrarian society, land reform is a revolutionary act because it
redistributes the major source of wealth, social standing, and
political power.
The wide-ranging effects of changes to land and land relation-
ships do not always register in corporate assessment, planning and
negotiation frameworks; often because ‘land tenure’ is generally
considered to be the responsibility of the nation state, and beyond
the bounds of ‘corporate responsibility’. The issue with land is that
its physical or tangible properties are often over-emphasized and
that social factors can, and often do, remain dormant for long
periods of time; that is, until conﬂict seemingly ‘erupts’. Having
failed to read the sub-surface social dynamics, companies are often
‘blindsided’ by land-related conﬂict.17 On the issue of land, we
15 Noting company does not need to resettle people in order to adversely affect
land relations and the overall working and security of entitlement bundles.
16 See Cernea (2000) and the risk of social disarticulation.
17 Sub-surface issues are those aspects of a particular social order that are not
immediately observable, either because they are complex and multifaceted and
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would therefore concur with scholars who position land as a
central construct in mine-community relations (e.g. Bebbington
et al., 2008; Macintyre, 2007; Hilson, 2002). Through Paige, we
suggest that land acquisition for mining can be, conceived as a
‘radical recalibration of relations’ and responded to as such; in
other words, with the full weight and signiﬁcance that a company
might attribute to a major crisis.
On the surface, as Ballard and Banks (2003, p. 300) explain in
Resource Wars: The Anthropology of Mining ‘land condenses a host
of social relationships for which territory serves as a form of
shorthand reference’. Rather than use land as a shorthand refer-
ence, the lesson from scholars such as Paige is that land holds
great value as an entry-point for uncovering underlying dynamics
around change, belief, relationships and the functioning of social
order. While mining companies and communities might both take
the liberty of using land as a shorthand reference, one can safely
assume that most are not referencing the same types of sub-
surface complexities when doing so.
Aside from both land tenure and mining ventures being akin to
major social institutions in their own right, there is an element in
considerations about land that are not easily recognized by mining
companies (or markets more generally). An example provided by
Tregarthen et al. (1978) reveals the difﬁculties of using market-
based analysis to effectively identify and measure nonmarket
factors. In their case study they explore the hypothetical example
of a grazing community in the resource rich area of Watkins,
Colorado. The major question posed by Tregarthen et al. was how
to calculate nonmarket factors in the absence of an established
price mechanism. As they put it: that:
Ranching provides two services to society – beef production
and the preservation of open space. The price system provides
signals concerning the value of beef but not of the open land.18
The point we are extracting from Tregarthen et al. is not the
need for a meaningful measure of compensation if mining goes
ahead, but the immediate problem of negotiating a consent
process based on incompatible value systems. What value, for
instance, is information if its underlying assumptions and concepts
do not resonate with the people receive it? A critical question for
FPIC, therefore, is the extent to which FPIC processes are able to
mediate value propositions associated with ‘priceless’ resources
and landscapes, and whether alternative or hybrid value systems
are available so that more dominant valuation methods are not
automatically assumed or applied.
A second area of focus in this section is the importance of
understanding conﬂict and its role in the changing and balancing
of social order. In his work Custom and Conﬂict in Africa (1955) the
anthropologist Max Gluckman outlined six paradoxes associated
with conﬂict phenomena to help us conceive of conﬂict as
productive and ‘natural’. The value of this seminal work is its
grounded illustration of the dependencies that exist between
conﬂict and order within the context of the ‘total social structure’.
One example provided by Gluckman is the role of marriage
in moderating the severity of conﬂict between clans; another
describes the range of vulnerabilities that exist between Kings and
their subjects, most notably the high expectations and subsequent
disappointments that come with authority and rule (in his chapter
Frailty in Authority). Patterns of low, medium and high levels of
conﬂict produce and re-reproduce a variety of social order
outcomes.
For readers who may be less familiar with Gluckman and other
foundation works, the contribution is in deﬁning the function of
conﬂict in relation to the workings of society as a whole. Gluck-
man's use of paradox is to problematize what appears to be a
contradiction in terms; that is how ‘custom’ (as a stabilizing
concept) and ‘conﬂict’ (as a de-stabilizing concept) operate inter-
dependently to create and re-create complex networks of social
relations. Rather than seeing conﬂict as an unnatural and destruc-
tive force, Gluckman makes the counter-claim: whatever the
short-term effects, conﬂict provides stability over the long-run.
These arguments are relevant to the mining sector for three
obvious reasons: ﬁrst, that conﬂict is and will continue to be a
constant force, both in the existing social context and between
company and community, and should be characterized and
accounted for from the outset of mining activities; second, that
the social change induced by mining is often justiﬁed on the basis
of an overall long-run beneﬁt, which the industry struggles to
demonstrate; and third, that the interdependencies that exist
between different sets of social forces need to be considered when
examining the potential (and possibilities inherent within) social
risk.
Scholarly debates about social change are in constant ﬂux.
Within this spectrum of ideas, there are key works that remain
pivotal, and which provide us with valuable insights and remin-
ders of that which is important in relations between companies
and communities. The use of multiple frameworks, particularly
given the diverse contexts and issues confronting the industry, is
essential for enabling the industry to detect and comprehend
different perspectives. In this vein, the concepts above represent
but a sample of approaches available to social specialists and
others within the mining industry. We have presented ideas
centered on entitlements, change and land relations, which we
regard as base concepts for the industry as it engages the
challenge of operationalizing FPIC.19
Conclusion
What we have not done in this article is take issue with the
notion of FPIC itself: an aggregate concept with foundations in
international human rights law designed to ‘level the playing
ﬁeld’, and a counter to the multifaceted and enduring forms of
marginalization and oppression of indigenous and ‘situated’ peo-
ples (Szawblowski, 2011). Instead, we have focused on FPIC's
application in mining contexts; a problem that surfaces when
FPIC's complex set of conditionalities are brought into frame.
Again, we have not used the existence of these conditionalities
as means of rejecting the FPIC proposition. Rather, we have argued
that a much deeper knowledge base is a prerequisite for the
effective implementation of FPIC. Given that ‘land’ and ‘labor
relations’ and natural resource ‘use’ and ‘ownership’ often sit at
the core of company–community relations – and many other
relationships of inequality throughout history – we have suggested
including a more expansive set of social science concepts and
(footnote continued)
therefore ‘hard to read’, or obscured from general view (Bebbington and Bury,
2013).
18 In this paper the authors develop a proposition for incorporating nonmarket
values into a cost-beneﬁt analysis system, whereby the various parties would agree
to a set rate per land unit (or even unit of production) to account for the loss of
social or esthetic goods. They argue: (1978, p. 357) ‘Some object in principle to any
attempt to measure a quality as subjective as, for example, esthetic costs. Can we
put a price tag on a ravaged landscape? The answer is that we not only can, we
must. Given some estimate of other beneﬁts and costs, a decision always implies
some valuation of esthetic factors, whether they are included explicitly in the
analysis or not. Selecting a value of zero (or inﬁnity) on grounds that beauty lies in
the eye of the beholder, rather than in a column of a ledger, makes little sense’.
19 We also acknowledge the need for the extractives sector to similarly engage
with foundation literature in other important debates, such as, for example, those
that relate to gender and cultural heritage, as means of building the knowledge
foundations implied by its espoused goals and objectives.
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readings into this debate. This includes contemporary literature
that has made ‘global mining’ its focus, in addition to literature
from cognate ﬁelds. Historical patterns in both arenas provide
insights into those social and economic issues that the industry so
often struggles to understand and integrate into its decision-
making processes. A deeper knowledge base may enable industry
actors to respond in more constructive ways than its own more
recent history suggests it is capable of.
We readily acknowledged that a ‘reading’ strategy will appear
unoriginal, even unproductive, to industry. However, it is our belief
that the ‘executive summary’ and ‘case vignette’ approach to
knowledge building and decision-making on complex social issues
must be broken. This approach is inadequate given the increasing
levels of complexity confronting the ﬁeld. What we are suggesting,
in its place, is a far more substantive engagement with sociological
and socio-historical context, including a more comprehensive
characterization of the conditionalities relating to FPIC in particular
circumstances. In this vein, we have highlighted a small selection of
key works that relate to many of the industry's real and present
challenges. While these (and many similar) works might be familiar
to those social and political scientists working to inﬂuence the
mining industry, we are concerned that the surface-level merits of
FPIC will blind those who are less familiar with this knowledge base.
A commitment to FPIC should be accompanied by a commitment to
re-thinking industry engagement with and application of social
knowledge.20 The general pattern of social performance from across
the industry suggests that this is an outstanding task, which needs to
be taken as something a priority.
We will no doubt be asked by whether this agenda should be a
task for corporate decision-makers, external advisers, mine man-
agers, specialist ‘social’ practitioners or non-industry actors. As we
have suggested elsewhere (Owen and Kemp, 2014), social profes-
sionals within industry increase their internal inﬂuence when they
understand the geological, technical, production and ﬁnancial
aspects of mining, and have commensurate resources to respond
to social complexity. Equally, it has become necessary for mine
managers and other industry decision-makers to grasp concepts of
land, entitlement and customary rights, social exchange and net-
works, conventions of reciprocity, and patterns of grievance and
conﬂict. There are too few industry leaderswho are conversantwith
these concepts. Those who are tend to be considered ‘exemplary’,
rather than typical of the ﬁeld. This suggests a more permissive
space for scholars and social specialists to push against accusations
of being too ‘academic’, and encourage industry to build its knowl-
edge base of sub-surface social issues. All actors must ensure that
the ‘above ground’ is similarly well prepared so that FPIC is not
‘forced’ in contexts that are not able to provide safeguards for the
most vulnerable.
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